Since 2010, Myanmar has been in the midst of a multifaceted transition, involving economic reforms, the resolution of multiple longstanding civil confl icts, and a nascent transition to democratic rule. Th ese transitions are coinciding with a resource-led economic boom. We assess the current status of governance institutions, as well as their performance in comparison to ASEAN and selected other countries. Specifi cally we discuss outstanding problem areas related to economic governance, particularly in the legal system, the business regulatory framework, and in bureaucratic capacity, as well as the potential use of external policy anchors, particularly in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process, to strengthen Myanmar's ongoing reform eff ort.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2010, Myanmar has been in the midst of a multifaceted transition, involving economic reforms, the resolution of multiple long-standing civil confl icts, and a nascent transition to democratic rule. Th ese transitions are coinciding with a resource-led economic boom, and all the blessings and challenges such booms entail. Taking place in parallel, the outcomes of each transition are interdependent, contingent on the outcomes of others. Th ese transitions provide a unique opportunity to engage in broad governance reform and develop the institutions necessary for a growing economy. Th e uneven progress on these issues since 2011 simply underscores that success is by no means preordained.
Good governance, or effi cient and transparent conduct of public aff airs and management of public resources, is close to a necessary condition for long-term economic growth. Governance is an inherently multifaceted concept that encompasses both formal rules and norms governing the conduct of public aff airs. Broadly speaking, it can be broken into three basic baskets: the legal and regulatory framework, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and government transparency/engagement with civil society.
While policy is obviously important, good governance is much more fundamental to economic development than any specifi c policy intervention. Good governance can be thought of as the creation of an environment in which benefi cial policy can be formulated and implemented in a socially inclusive manner.
Without good governance, countries fail to unlock the full potential of their human and natural capital. For society to make productive investments in human and physical capital, it needs assurances that these investments will not be expropriated-directly or indirectly-and that contracts will be enforced by independent, nonpartisan courts, even when it is not in the short-term interest of the government for them to do so.
1 Moreover, these assurances are particularly valuable for courting investment from fi rms in developed countries and investment in the nonresource sector, whose development will be crucial for generating nonresource-related exports and employment. For markets to truly fl ourish, the government must be able to effi ciently provide market-sustaining public goods, in the form of transparent market regulation, infrastructure, and enforcement of contracts. For these benefi ts to be widely shared and promote social inclusion, policies should be crafted in collaboration and consultation with civil society groups.
In this working paper, we assess the state of governance reform in Myanmar and outstanding challenges facing the country's political elites, civil society, and both state-owned and private fi rms.
1. To be clear, the constitution prohibits direct expropriation. However, investors can be indirectly expropriated by changing rules and regulations after the investment has been undertaken. Th is consideration points to the need for a strong court system to impartially adjudicate such disputes.
Section II assesses the current status of governance institutions, as well as their performance in comparison to ASEAN and selected other countries. Section III discusses outstanding problem areas related to economic governance, particularly in the legal system, the business regulatory framework, and bureaucratic capacity, and provides specifi c policy recommendations for leveling the playing fi eld between state economic enterprises (SEEs), military-affi liated enterprises, and the private sector. Section IV discusses opportunities to engage civil society in Myanmar's economic governance and the peace process.
Section V addresses the potential use of external policy anchors, particularly the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) process, to strengthen Myanmar's ongoing reform eff ort, before section VI concludes with a brief summary of key policy recommendations.
II. CROSS-NATIONAL INDICATORS OF GOVERNANCE
In recent years a consensus has emerged on the importance of institutions, governance, and, specifi cally, transparency for economic development. Challenges in assessing the quality of institutions or governance, or the degree of transparency or corruption, are nontrivial, however. Cross-national surveys have become an important means of benchmarking absolute performance, relative ranking, and direction trends across a variety of relevant metrics. While there may be a "beauty pageant" aspect to this evidence, it likely contains some "true" information and at an absolute minimum can be interpreted as a valid indication of the perceptions of local and outside observers.
One of the immediate diffi culties confronting both analysts and policymakers alike is the sheer number of such indicators and their reliance on sometimes overlapping sources of information. Even if these challenges can be sorted out, one still has to prioritize various agenda items and devise actual policy responses.
David Givens (2013) carefully examines a huge number of these indicators to statistically separate redundancy and derive the true new information in each measure, then determines the dimensions of governance that have the biggest impact on growth performance. He fi nds that measures relating to "market infrastructure"-essentially rule of law and corruption-and "civil liberties"-essentially other dimensions of rule of law plus voice-have the biggest impact on growth, surpassing such infl uences on growth as international trade and geography.
In this section we review Myanmar's performance on a number of these cross-national surveys of governance, focusing on rule of law and the extent of corruption. We then link back to these themes in the concluding section on how international initiatives can be used to anchor Myanmar's own eff orts to improve performance in these areas. In almost all cases, we benchmark Myanmar's performance against local comparators Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and Viet Nam (together, the CLMV countries).
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Th e bottom line is that Myanmar's economic governance needs improvement on most of these indicators. Evidence derived from Myanmar-based respondents in the World Economic Forum's Global
Competitiveness Report survey indicates that fi nancing and governance issues are at the top of the list of obstacles to development (WEF 2014) . 2 However, some improvement in recent years is evident in the data, reinforcing the notion that the country's recent reforms are being recognized around the world.
Th ese results also underscore a basic lesson: Myanmar has nowhere to go but up, and as its institutional practices converge on global norms, we can expect to observe a concomitant reduction in the risk premium associated with doing business in Myanmar, increased foreign investment on better fi nancial terms, and an overall acceleration in growth and improvement in outcomes. In the fi nal section we discuss some specifi cs of how external policy anchors can be leveraged to further this eff ort.
We start by examining how local market participants evaluate their own environment. Figure 1 reports
Myanmar respondents' ranking of the WEF's "most problematic factors for doing business," a mixture of institutional, policy, and economics fundamentals challenges (WEF 2014) . Th e top fi ve most problematic factors are access to fi nancing (18.0), corruption (13.9), ineffi cient government bureaucracy (9.7), inadequately educated workforce (8.7), and policy instability (8.6). Following these are inadequate supply of infrastructure (7.1), foreign currency regulations (6.2), tax regulations (4.8), infl ation (4.0), government instability/coups (3.8), poor work ethic in the national labor force and restrictive labor regulations (both 3.8), tax rates (3.3), insuffi cient capacity to innovate (2.1), crime and theft (1.6), and poor public health (0.6). In short, in a substantial sample of Myanmar's businesspeople, governance issues such as corruption and an ineffi cient bureaucracy are considered among the most serious obstacles to economic advancement.
How does Myanmar stack up in a comparative perspective? Table 1 similar, though the country scores close to last place in terms of enforcing contracts (2.1 percent) whereas it sits comfortably above the lowest decile on resolving insolvency (15.4 percent). (Turnell 2011 , Mieno 2013 ).
In 2011, President Th ein Sein launched a wide-ranging and ongoing reform program, covering not only the economy but also internal political issues and foreign relations. Th e National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established (and reorganized in 2014) . Th e NHRC has launched a website, and state media published material specifying the complaint process and necessary documentation. Th e right to publicly demonstrate (subject to notifi cation) was introduced, and draft legislation on the right of association is under debate. 9 Application of the peaceful protest law by local authorities has been controversial, however, and in June 2014 amendments were enacted to improve implementation.
Labor legislation (the Trade Union Law, 2011), liberal by regional standards, has been enacted allowing unions, and protecting the employment of workers joining a union or participating in a strike, though activists complain of problems in implementation. As of October 2013, more than 500 basic labor organizations (unions) had been certifi ed and wildcat labor unrest is being transformed into legal strikes.
Censorship has been greatly diminished with the abolition of the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division, private publications have commenced political reporting, and independent newspapers began publication in April 2013 (Steinberg 2013a, Clapp and DiMaggio 2013) . As we argue below, the development of civil society and a free press are key aspects of making transparency initiatives like the EITI work.
9. Reforms aimed at opening space for civil society are discussed further in section IV.  constituted a working group in the president's offi ce "to make necessary preparations to meet these standards for transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and technology and innovation" (Clapp and DiMaggio 2013, 4) .
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Myanmar's fi scal processes, which had been among the most opaque in the world, have opened up (International Budget Partnership 2013) . In 2012, the state budget was publicly debated in parliament and published in private newspapers for the fi rst time, and the auditor general "has been given a measure of independence" (McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 14) . As a result of this greater openness, the state budget is beginning to change in ways refl ecting greater accountability to the public. Expenditures on health and education have risen by 78 and 50 percent, respectively . Historically, tax measures were somewhat arbitrarily implemented, and the government has accepted that going forward "all taxation-related orders and instructions be enshrined in legislation" (Vriens and Partners 2013b, 6) . In 2014, legislation was enacted with the aims of streamlining administration and broadening the tax base, though the IMF expressed concerns that numerous exemptions reduced the system's revenue generation potential (IMF 2014a). Public records indicate that Myanmar's largest fi rms have stepped up tax payments (Vriens and Partners 2014) .
With respect to external relations, the government enacted the Exports and Imports Law (2012) "to make policies and functions related to exports and imports in line with international norms, and to facilitate exports and imports" (Min and Kudo 2012, 47) . Th e law repeals the Control of Imports and Nevertheless, the foreign investment regime is still inadequate and further work remains to be done; for example, the McKinsey Global Institute complains in its report on the outlook for Myanmar's economy that foreign direct investment (FDI) is still restricted in some sectors, and the new law places limits on the ability to repatriate profi ts (McKinsey Global Institute 2013) . Th e most recent IMF Article IV report observes that these remaining restrictions are minor but should be removed to comply with IMF Article VII obligations, as well as ASEAN Economic Community requirements (IMF 2013). Foreign investment has, to date, been targeted mostly at extractive sectors, which, while growth promoting, tend to employ comparatively small, often imported, labor forces. Diversifying FDI toward light manufacturing and agriculture will be necessary for Myanmar to take advantage of its fertile land and large, working-age population.
Property Rights and Factor Markets
Myanmar is sometimes described as a "transitional economy" and lumped together with neighbors such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam. Th e reality is more complex, however. Private property rights are delineated and nationalization prohibited under the constitution. And unlike its neighbors, nominally private businesses, not state-owned enterprises, are already at the center of the economy. But these entities may refl ect deep state connections: Th ey either are former SEEs with implicit expectations of bailouts if they run into diffi culties or are simply controlled by politically connected cronies. State infl uence is more profound than notional fi gures on private sector activity would suggest.
The Land Market
Th e land market remains problematic. Constitutionally, all land is residually owned by the state (Steinberg 2013b hectares. In June 2013 the press reported that the Minister of Defense Brigadier General Wai Lwin promised to return confi scated land that was not being used, or about 8 percent of the disputed property.
Th ere are now disputes over the defi nition of "use" and claims that the military rushed to construct improvements to demonstrate the land was under use (Vriens and Partners 2013a , 2013c .
Beyond the obvious commercial stakes, this particular aspect of the land issue is likely to take a long time to sort out, insofar as it turns on the image of the military and its relationship to the broader society, as well as military practices such as requiring soldiers to grow their own food. Th e government has formed a Central Land Management Committee and set a one-year deadline for resolving 745 targeted disputes.
Th e Farmland Law (2012), while representing progress, is inadequate. Th e law allows farmers use rights (though not for the extraction of subsoil minerals). Th e bill strengthens protections for farmers from "land grabbing" by private entities, while maintaining the government's right to exercise the principle of eminent domain in exchange for "suitable compensation" (Nehru 2013, 11) . In other low-income countries where farmers have been given the right to "permanently transfer" their user rights or the right to sell land, "land ownership concentration has increased dramatically, creating large numbers of landless and exacerbating poverty" (Nehru 2013, 11) . It is claimed that "Despite the passage of a new land law by the parliament, people in Myanmar are still being unfairly displaced by large businesses and agricultural projects without adequate compensation or means of providing a livelihood. Th is is largely a legal matter, in which the law itself still allows sizeable tracts of land to be seized" (Clapp and DiMaggio 2013, 11) . Ultimately the solution is not simply more effi cient legal systems but more systematic programs to ensure that large-scale development projects are adequately inclusive and address the legitimate interests and needs of local residents and that those residents are aff orded stable land rights that are not subject to abrogation by politically connected interests. A new draft Land Use Law was unveiled in October 2014.
Th e use (and misuse) of forest land is also an issue. According to Kevin Woods (2013), Myanmar's timber land can be divided into fi ve categories:
 state-managed (Myanmar Timber Enterprise) forests;
 logging concessions in natural forests, most in ethnic minority populated areas;
 land conversion in natural forests, also occurring in, though not limited to, areas of ethnic confl ict;
 a limited number of tree plantations; and  community forests, where commercial logging is prohibited.
Th e last category is the only one in which local communities have legal land or resource use rights, and not surprisingly logging activities have been subject to considerable internal controversy.
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In this context, the controversy over the Letpadaung copper mine could provide a salutary learning moment. Th e March 2013 parliamentary commission report, which attempted to address various stakeholder interests, could form a model for other such disputes, calling for "adequate social and environmental safeguards from companies, transparency in the conduct of the project, proper compensation for local people who have been displaced, adequate provisions for their future livelihoods, preservation of local cultural and religious sites where appropriate, and training for local populations to provide the skills needed to work on the project" (Clapp and DiMaggio 2013, 12) .
Likewise there are issues with respect to urban or industrial use land. Th e government has established 18 industrial parks in nine states and regions under the auspices of the Industrial Development 13. Timber exports are also subject to controversy as taken up below.
Committee chaired by the Minister of Industry No. 2 (Min and Kudo 2012, McKinsey Global Institute 2013) . Investors have complained of bottlenecks, however, with regard to lack of available land for industrial development and the high price of unimproved land in these estates (Pun 2012, Min and Kudo 2012) . It has been estimated that only 20 percent of the land in the existing zones is currently used for industrial production; the other 80 percent is used for activities such as warehousing or is unused altogether.
To spur industrial development, the state should lease land at competitive rates to anyone who will build a factory and provide employment; the land could revert to the state if the factory closed.
Concurrent with these new leases, the Ministry of Finance and Revenue should conduct a comprehensive land survey-security conditions permitting-in order to establish a current cadaster map of the country's territory and promote transparency in land use and tenure.
The Labor Market
Th e state has enacted or is considering a number of major pieces of labor reform legislation. As of September 2013, a minimum wage law is under consideration. Th e Social Security Law (2012) updates the earlier Social Security Act (1954) . Th e law creates a Social Security Board empowered to provide medical and social care insurance, family support insurance (in case of natural disaster), disability and pension benefi ts, unemployment insurance, and other social transfer schemes. In coordination with the Ministry of Labor, the board is permitted to establish offi ces and facilities to deliver these services and benefi ts. Th e labor ministry has been instructed to establish the fi rm size at which these obligations kick in. 
The Capital Market
Although eff orts are ongoing to establish direct capital markets (and indeed a tiny stock market opened in October 2014), it is safe to assume that for the foreseeable future enterprises in Myanmar will continue to rely primarily on a bank-dominated system of indirect fi nance.
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Th e banking system consists of four state-owned banks, which have their origins in a monobank system under the socialist regime, and 19 private banks established in the 1990s when the Financial Institutions Law (1990) permitted the creation of private banks (Mieno 2013) . Th ere is currently no foreign operational banking presence, though the government is in the process of fi nalizing regulations that will permit entry via joint ventures with local banks, and some foreign banks have begun establishing representative offi ces . Th e IMF assesses that supervision of local banks lags well behind international standards, including with respect to anti-money laundering.
14 Many of the local banks are subsidiaries of large conglomerates. Such an arrangement, where industrial conglomerates own private banks, has proved to be problematic in other settings.
Th e state-owned banks and private banks each account for roughly half of bank assets. Of the four state banks, Myanmar Economic Bank is by far the largest, accounting for more than 40 percent of the sector's assets. So in reality, the banking system could be described as a single bank dominant system with a fringe of much smaller competitors.
Th e system does not appear to do a particularly good job of channeling capital to the private sector, with the share of domestic credit going to the private sector a mere fraction of that observed in Cambodia, Lao PDR, or Viet Nam (IMF 2010 , Turnell 2011 . Instead, regulations have historically included a ban on private lending to farmers, outmoded quantitative limits on deposit and loan rates implying negative interest rates, a ban on the provision of uncollateralized credit, a ban on "at call" deposits, which are used to manage liquidity in most other banking systems, and a ban on deposit withdrawals from the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB), which unsurprisingly discourages new deposits, discouraging the eff ective intermediation of savings and formal sector fi nancial deepening beyond a narrow stratum of participants.
Th e situation is changing, however. Th e IMF reports that the country's eligible collateral has been expanded to include agricultural exportables; deposit rates have been liberalized within a fi xed band;
and the MADB has increased credit limits to farmers. Th e banks are opening more branches, and new technologies such as credit cards and automated teller machines are being introduced. Th erefore, access to banking, at least for the urban middle class, appears to be improving.
Apart from the debilitating eff ect that the atrophied state of the banking sector has on development, the lack of fi nancial inclusion could contribute to undesirable long-term political economy developments.
Groups either with access to capital outside the local banking sector, notably the ethnic Chinese minority, 14 . Th e last issue is suffi ciently acute that the country has been warned by the multilateral Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that it could face countermeasures that would reverse recent advances in cross-border fi nancial integration. In 2014 an Anti-Money Laundering Law and a related Anti-Terrorism Law were passed to address FATF concerns, but the IMF assesses that "substantial defi ciencies remain in the Anti-Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime" (IMF 2014a, 14) .
or with privileged access to fi nance, such as the military, may come to dominate the private sector economy and the emergent middle class. Such a development and its implied blunting of socio-economic mobility could become a source of tension (Steinberg 2013a (Steinberg , 2013b ).
In sum, as one analyst observes, "Despite the dramatic expansion of private sector banks in Myanmar, they still remain the private 'asset managers' of particular conglomerates and do not yet appear to function as eff ective fi nancial intermediaries in the national economy. Th ere is obviously room for further development in the effi cient functioning of fi nancial intermediaries in Myanmar" (Mieno 2013, 113-14) .
In August 2014 nine foreign banks were issued licences to operate. Th e licences require $75 million investment and restrict the foreign banks to a single branch lending only in foreign currencies to foreign companies and local banks. In the words of one commentator, "the restrictions are aimed both to protect the local fi nancial services sector and to encourage the transfer of knowledge and best practices by encouraging foreign-local cooperation"
15
, and the on-lending to local banks may create a potential for local fi rms to access foreign banks through syndicated loans (Turnell 2014) .
Corporate Governance
Given the state domination of the fi nancial sector and the ubiquity of SEEs and politically connected enterprises in the economy, corporate governance in Myanmar has been historically problematic. Th e basic issue is that the SEEs were not subjected to hard budget constraints, and benefi tted from capital channeled by the state-dominated banking sector, provisions of subsidies, and dispensation from paying taxes (Kubo 2012) . However, recent reforms should mitigate, if not terminate, such practices.
Exchange rate reforms have been important in this regard. Prior to April 2012, the offi cial and unoffi cial exchange rates diverged markedly, with the offi cial exchange rate implying a much higher value of the kyat than the unoffi cial rate determined in the market. With the introduction of a managed fl oat in April 2012, the reference rate has converged on the market rate eliminating the implicit subsidization of the SEEs that occurred via the exchange rate mechanism (Kubo 2012 , Mieno 2013 the SEEs from the state budget as well as the abolition of price controls and the implicit cross-subsidies in the state sector" (Kubo 2013, 26) . From 2013-14, profi table SEEs are expected to self-fi nance working capital, while the state will continue to fi nance 20 percent of the working capital of loss-making SEEs.
Th is change represents a move toward greater fi nancial autonomy for the SEEs insofar as the state fi nanced 78 percent of the working capital of these enterprises previously (IMF 2013).
However, in February 2011, just before the military junta left offi ce, there was a massive privatization of state assets, which some observers likened to a "fi re sale" (e.g., Kubo 2013) . As a consequence, the soft budget constraint issue may now manifest in a diff erent form, similar to that observed with respect to the government sponsored enterprises at the heart of the 2007-08 fi nancial crisis in the United States.
Th e problem is one of moral hazard, where ostensibly private enterprises engage in risky behavior because they believe themselves to be indemnifi ed against losses due to their political connections. Specifi cally, the expectation is that these now nominally private enterprises, in many cases controlled by former offi cials, could seek help from the government after making bad investments, thus increasing the likelihood that bad investments would be made; or, similarly, banks may infer that the government is likely to bail out bad loans made to the former SEEs and thus not scrutinize borrowing carefully. Th e situation in Traditionally, nontax revenue has been low, accounting for only 2.1 percent of GDP (OECD 2013), which is quite low in light of the centrality of extractive industries to the economy. Mined commodities, especially hydrocarbons, are usually associated with much higher state revenues, as the concentration of production and labor around mines and wells-including off shore platforms-constitutes a natural tax handle, or bottleneck in the production of a good, which makes evasion inherently diffi cult. Th e
Myanmar experience is partly a function of the since-reformed exchange rate mechanism and can be expected to be rectifi ed under the new exchange rate regime. 17 Nevertheless, the low levels of tax collection are also in part due to the design of the tax system but also due to low levels of tax compliance and enforcement. 17. Th e issue relates to the aforementioned implicit subsidy to SEEs via the old exchange rate mechanism. Royalties and revenues from gas exports entered the budget at the offi cial exchange rate until exchange rate unifi cation, opening up the possibility of all sorts of "leakages" (Kubo 2013 Hanel, and Th urner 2009; see fi gure 5). As ministries proliferate, it becomes more diffi cult both to achieve collective decisions and to coordinate policy implementation across ministries. Whether this is due to declining effi ciency in collective decision-making, increasing transaction costs of coordinating policy at the implementation stage, or both, has not been tested, but it is likely that both play a role.
Also, more government ministries provide more government jobs and thus more opportunities for staffi ng ministries as a form of political patronage. One obvious option is to continue raising wages in the public sector, a strategy successfully implemented by Singapore (Rahman 1986 ). However, wage increases may not by themselves be suffi cient, for several reasons. First, wage increases that would be necessary to stamp out corruption and retain the most eff ective bureaucrats might be so large as to be impractical: on the order of two to eight times the wages in the manufacturing sector (Besley and McLaren 1993, Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001) .
Second, the long-term retention eff ects of wage increases are likely to be eroded by continued growth in the private sector. Th ird, given the size of the public sector, across-the-board wage increases could have undesirable infl ationary eff ects. Moreover, general wage increases benefi t both highly productive and shirking employees alike and may actually lower morale among the most talented.
Developing-country governments have tried a variety of alternatives to build longer-term allegiance to bureaucratic careers among desirable workers. One possibility would be to train and construct a career ladder for a cadre of elite civil servants. Career-based elite civil services, such as those in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, are staff ed via entry-level recruitment according to performance on an elite exam, with small proportions being nominated to serve from within the existing civil service (World Bank 2012c). If successfully implemented, this would endow the Myanmar government with a young, cohesive cohort of civil servants who could be induced to stay long-term by informal social bonds. While attractive, this option would not fulfi ll the present staffi ng needs of the Myanmar government, which likely needs to be supplemented at the outset with a broader civil service based on performance reports.
Th ese elite services act as teams within the broader bureaucracy and can be signifi cant agents of change.
A complementary measure would be to off er delayed rewards: establishing attractive pensions and retirement benefi ts, such as subsidized insurance. Th is strategy may be advisable for two reasons. First, the deferment of benefi ts to late life means that the eff ect on current expenditures need not be as large as 20. "Salaries of skilled workers in Myanmar to rise up to 50%," Eleven, October 22, 2012, http://elevenmyanmar.com/business/1038-salaries-of-skilled-workers-in-myanmar-to-rise-up-to-50.
with wage increases (Becker and Stigler 1974) . Second, these types of benefi ts would have minimal impact on infl ation, as they would not entail large injections of cash into the local economy. Another option would be to reward performance. Implementing a two-tier salary structure, consisting of a base wage and a variable wage that would be based on performance, would be one way of addressing this issue. Finally, another option would be to enhance recruitment eff orts aimed at those individuals who are discriminated against in the private labor market for reasons of disability, gender, or religion. Th ese individuals can be recruited and retained at lower costs. Th is suggestion should not be taken as encouraging discrimination, but rather recognizing that it exists and can be exploited by the public sector. Moreover, a diversifi cation of the civil service could enhance central government credibility among peripheral minority groups. to break down stovepipes in policy formation, they lack independent secretariats. Whatever issues or policy initiatives emerge out of the committee meetings are then reassigned to the independent ministries later. Providing these units with independent secretariats would be a useful step in enhancing policy coordination. Th e ADB is providing some support for the development of a 20-year, integrated energy master plan, but similar infusions of resources-and help with cross-ministry planning and coordination-would be welcome (ADB 2013). At the national level, the Ministry of National Planning should be tasked with coordinating policy. Policy coordination between a coordinating ministry and a line ministry is diffi cult enough; divvying up the coordinating responsibilities between two ministries amplifi es the associated problems. If planning and fi nance are so intimately linked that assigning the master planning role to one ministry would be unworkable, another model would be to merge the 20 marine fi sheries. Moreover, state and regional governments will be responsible for implementing central government directives alongside central government ministries. Additional staffi ng demands will be signifi cant. Th e state and regional governments will form their own cabinets, with ministers drawn from the elected state and regional Hluttaws and subject to fi nal approval by the president. As at the national level, the minister for border and security aff airs will be appointed by the commander-in-chief of the defense services. However, these ministries will not have direct power over hiring and promotion in these bureaucracies, which will be conducted by the national line ministries. Th is practice blurs the lines of delegation, with bureaucrats potentially receiving confl icting directives and assignments from national and state-and regional-level ministers. Moreover, regional ministers will be fewer in number than line ministries, meaning that individual regional and state ministers will have to shoulder multiple portfolios with a single ministry's staff and resources (Nixon et al. 2013) . Th ese circumstances are ripe for an increase in corrupt practices, as blurred lines of delegation complicate oversight.
IV. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PEACE PROCESS Civil Society
Since 2011, the Myanmar government has enacted wide-ranging reforms that should support development of a more robust civil society, even if they fall short of guaranteeing true freedom of press and assembly. Press censorship has been eased by the abolition of the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division.
Prior to its abolition in 2012, all newspaper articles were subject to its purview. Th e state's monopoly on daily print media has ended as well. As of April 1, 2013, four privately owned daily newspapers went into circulation, though private newspapers still require government-issued permits. released on October 11, 2011 (NHRC 2011 , and hundreds of political dissidents have returned from abroad after the government removed over 2,000 individuals from a "blacklist" that prohibited entry into the country. Nevertheless, the NHRC has thus far not investigated claims of human rights abuses in confl ict zones, where conditions are likely much worse.
A welcome sign has been an enhanced role for civil society in the policy formation and advising process. As discussed above, an independent think tank, the Myanmar Development Resource Institute was formed. It consists of three components: economics, law, and security and political aff airs. Th is group has been tasked with acting as the secretariat in Myanmar's EITI application (see following section). As Myanmar's private sector develops, opportunities to leverage private expertise through public-private partnerships (PPPs) should be expanded as well (ADB 2008) . While many PPPs take the form of large investment projects, cofi nanced by private fi rms and governments, PPPs can also take the form of contracting with private sector fi rms to provide highly specialized services to the government.
PPPs have been a widely used mechanism for developing infrastructure, particularly in the areas of telecommunications, power generation, water and sanitation, and transportation infrastructure. Given
Myanmar's needs in all these areas PPPs may help channel private investment into the provision of public services.
Improvements in communications infrastructure will help spur both economic growth and civil society. As of 2012, only one out of 100 Myanmar people had internet access, and telephone lines were similarly scarce. Cellular subscriptions, however, are up over 800 percent since 2010, with more than 5 million cellular subscribers nationwide (World Bank 2013a). Th e telecommunications sector was recently opened to foreign investment, which is expected to make cell phones less expensive and thus within reach of the broader population. As has been the experience in other countries, this is expected to have both economic and social-political eff ects by facilitating communication among private citizens.
While the long-term eff ects of a burgeoning civil society will likely be very positive, the opening of political space for private, nonstate actors is not always an unalloyed blessing. Independent civil societies can and will mobilize to protest reforms, particularly those that entail the withdrawal of perceived benefi ts. Moreover, not all civil society actors are necessarily benevolent, which implies that the government must play a larger role in punishing and deterring such violent actions, especially as they may have the potential to escalate.
Peace Process
Myanmar's past history of unrest has been a signifi cant brake on economic development. While countryspecifi c estimates are not feasible, Valerie Cerra and Sweta Saxena (2008) While these are positive developments, a ceasefi re should not be viewed as marking the cessation of hostilities. Confl ict could resume if the underlying issues that generated the confl icts are not addressed.
Th e 2010 constitution began the process of transitioning more governance roles to regional governments, thereby granting minority groups greater policy autonomy. However, the stability of these ethno-federal and/or power-sharing arrangements is not guaranteed. Arend Lijphart (1977) , Alfred Stepan (1999) , and
Ted Robert Gurr (2000) all argue the merits of decentralization, through either federalism or some power- Electoral systems research comes up with three classes of solutions: closed-list proportional representation; rules that require parties to run candidates across the country, rather than just in ethnic homelands, as in Indonesia 23 ; and preferential voting systems. In preferential voting systems, voters rank their preferences over candidates within their district (Reilly 2002) . Th e idea is to encourage parties not just to campaign for fi rst-place votes but to court second-place votes as well, pooling votes across ethnic lines and thus decreasing ethnic identity as a salient driver of political affi liations. Alternative vote is a single member district system that requires an absolute majority, rather than plurality; if an absolute majority is not gained in the fi rst round, the candidate with the lowest number of fi rst-place votes is eliminated, and their votes are distributed to the remaining candidates. Single transferable vote is a proportional representation system with multimember districts, with a "quota" of votes required to elect a single candidate, and a subsequently similar redistribution of remaining fi rst-place votes. Either of these reforms would help to reduce the salience of ethnic identity in partisan politics.
V. EXTERNAL POLICY ANCHORS AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI)
Myanmar is reforming its policies and practices on governance. External anchors can be used to promote internal reforms, reinforce credibility, and lock in commitments. In particular, Myanmar's transformation is occurring in the context of a massive resource boom. EITI and other international anticorruption eff orts can be used to deepen and strengthen Myanmar's ongoing eff orts in this area. 
Resource Development Context
Myanmar has incredibly rich and diverse mineral resources, ranging from precious stones to oil and natural gas. Th e country has an estimated 283 billion to 334 billion cubic meters of natural gas, with much higher reserve potential, along with 50 million barrels of crude oil reserves (US Energy Information Administration 2013, British Petroleum 2013). Th e country has 90 percent of the world's jade reserves.
Th e offi cial jade market is large and in reality potentially perhaps 40 percent larger due to the illicit nature of much of the trade and the location of many signifi cant deposits in areas of political confl ict, particularly Kachin and Shan states. A revision of the 1994 Mining Law is being contemplated. A strengthened legal framework, streamlined approvals process, and a removal of export bans on certain minerals could induce billions of dollars of FDI infl ows and transform the sector.
In addition to minerals, Myanmar exports considerable timber (perhaps more than 2.5 million cubic meters), though assessing the true volume of timber exports, as in the case of semi-precious stones, is impeded by the problem of illegal exports (Woods 2013) .
Energy and minerals account for perhaps half of exports, and foreign direct investment has been overwhelmingly targeted at the mineral and natural gas sectors. Sixty-one companies, including Total, Eni, and other large multinationals that are EITI stakeholders, have registered to bid on both onshore and 30 off shore blocks in 2013; 20 more off shore oil and gas blocks were auctioned to companies including Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and Statoil, with a further nine blocks to be auctioned in 2015. Pipelines to carry the oil and gas to end-users traverse the country, including through areas largely inhabited by ethnic minorities, and protests have at times disrupted the operation of oil and gas pipelines.
An open issue is whether economic and political institutions are capable of successfully managing the sudden infl ux of wealth this mineral boom will generate, or whether the wealth will complicate macroeconomic management, inhibiting development of nonenergy sectors and complicating the country's political reforms.
Countries whose wealth is heavily derived from the exploitation natural resources tend to be poorer and grow more slowly than those whose wealth is based on the accumulation of human and physical capital. However, the empirical literature on the resource curse-the tendency of resource-dependent economies to grow more slowly for purely economic reasons, such as resource pulls and crowding out, Dutch disease, price volatility, etc.-has reached consensus that these economic phenomena cause only slightly negative eff ects. Th e potentially most deleterious eff ects of natural resource wealth on economic development may rather operate indirectly, through institutions and confl ict.
Dependence on high-value, mined commodities has negative eff ects for bureaucratic and state capacity and political violence-all of which exert direct or indirect eff ects on economic growth. It is perhaps no accident that the two countries with which Myanmar tied for last place in the open budget 25 index were Qatar and Equatorial Guinea, two oil exporters. However, the negative eff ects for bureaucratic capacity and political violence-the factors with the clearest implications for economic growth-are found to be largely contingent on the quality of preexisting institutions and, in the case of confl ict, certain attributes of the resources themselves.
Whether natural resource wealth leads to violence is largely a function of both attributes of the resource itself and the technology of its extraction, and the preexisting political, economic and social environment. Commodities with high value-to-weight ratios, such as gemstones, oil, cocaine, and opium, are ideal contestable, or "lootable," goods, and indeed the gem trade has fueled some of Myanmar's peripheral insurgencies for decades.
With respect to hydrocarbons, location is key. Th e relevant distinction is onshore versus off shore production. Onshore oil production increases the probability of confl ict onset by 50 percent relative to the baseline risk, in contrast to off shore production, which has no eff ect. Th is disparity in impact across the two settings is due to the diff erential opportunities onshore versus off shore production create for rent seeking by violent actors. Transporting onshore hydrocarbons to terminals for export generally requires large, aboveground networks of pipelines. Th is onshore infrastructure creates a network of targetsincluding pipelines and the workers who service them-only a few of which can truly be hardened against attack. Deep-pocketed energy companies make attractive targets for insurgents, who may have limited capacity to hold and defend such installations but signifi cant capacity to extort. Myanmar's own experience with its pipeline through Shan state-which has been sabotaged by insurgents in the past-shows this in action. In contrast, off shore platforms are comparatively easy to defend, since most insurgent groups do not have naval capacity and have limited capacity to extract rents from off shore production. As Myanmar's production transitions to more off shore gas fi elds, its gas infrastructure will be less prone to sabotage.
Many seemingly resource-related confl icts have occurred in societies that would be among the most-likely candidates for confl ict outbreak, even absent the role of contestable resources: Countries like Colombia, Indonesia, and Myanmar are at elevated risk of experiencing confl ict because of past histories of violence, comparatively low levels of economic development, and horizontal inequalities. For this reason, political reforms aimed at redressing horizontal inequalities-such as those between the ethnic majority and minorities-are vital.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
Policy concerns regarding the potentially negative institutional aspects of the resource curse fall into two basic categories. Th e fi rst revolve around fi scal issues. Proposed solutions typically involve the adoption of fi scal policy rules (including the possibility of dedicating or earmarking expenditures for particular 26 programs with the expectation that they will generate a broad political constituency for transparency and accountability), the creation of natural resource or sovereign wealth funds, and/or direct distribution of resource rents via cash transfers/dividends to the public, or what has been called "oil to cash."
Each of these proposals has merits and drawbacks, and some judicious mixture of all three (a natural resource or sovereign wealth fund, earmarks for particular programs, and dividends payments) may be ideal. However, in this context we focus on institutional concerns that are much more foundational to economic development than any specifi c policy intervention.
Over the past decade, a number of international good governance initiatives, including the Kimberley Process Certifi cation Scheme (KPCS) and associated Diamond Development Initiative, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the Confl ict Minerals Trade initiative, have emerged to address the resource management challenges described in the previous section. 24 In July 2014, Myanmar was accepted as a candidate country to the EITI, the focus of this section. 25 It is also pursuing a pilot project to push down EITI to the state level.
EITI works off of two components: disclosure, which is supposed to generate the information needed to reduce corruption, and the establishment of country-level multistakeholder bodies, which in principle absorb and propagate this information to enforce accountability.
Th e fi rst component aims to build double entry accounts that can be checked for consistency.
Governments must require extractive fi rms operating within their territory to disclose payments to governments to explore or extract energy or minerals, and governments must record revenues that they receive from extraction. A third-party independent administrator reconciles these fi gures. A current source of contention is whether those payments are aggregated or reported on a company-by-company basis, as is now required by laws in the United States and European Union. Roughly half of EITI member countries publish only aggregate amounts; the other half publish their results by company (Moran 2013). 26 Myanmar can choose to make such reporting mandatory.
Th e second component is the establishment of a formal multistakeholder group that evaluates the information provided by the fi rms, the government, and the third-party administrator. Finally, an outside body validates the reports in conjunction with the stakeholder group. Th e external validation is supposed to close a loop between the government and the governed.
24. Th is section draws on Hendrix and Noland (2014) . In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, the European Union, United States, and Australia all maintain their own regulations on the importation of timber from Myanmar, which have created a trade regime somewhat similar to the confl ict minerals regulatory regime.
25. Th e United States is also in the process of applying to EITI and has entered into a partnership with Myanmar to provide political and technical assistance to implement best practices in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. While EITI was originally oriented toward the oil sector, several signatories produced other minerals and were not primarily oil producers. EITI is being expanded to include fi sheries and forestry in some countries. Th ere is no reason, for example, that Myanmar cannot also apply EITI to the production of timber, and not just oil, gas, and minerals.
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Th e eff ectiveness of EITI is in signifi cant part a function of the degree of buy-in by host governments.
Th e pact is voluntary. A government committed to behaving corruptly may simply not participate. Th ere is no mechanism for directly sanctioning noncompliance, though there may be reputational or signaling costs. 29 EITI focuses on a single point in the production chain (the transfer of money from the fi rm to the government) and ignores critical upstream stages (contracting and procurement) and downstream activities (expenditure).
Th e stakeholder body is also potentially a point of weakness depending on the preexisting strength of civil society and on the attitude of the government. EITI creates a platform for communication between the government, the companies, and civil society and establishes a set of internationally accepted norms and procedures. But in some countries, particularly those that have recently transitioned from more autocratic forms of rule, the press and NGOs remain weak, making eff ective civil society participation diffi cult. And in some other countries, the government literally appoints the stakeholder representatives, allowing it to pack the body with cronies who may have little interest in rocking the boat. Similarly, EITI may spur national legislation to strengthen regulation of the extractive sector.
27. See EITI website, http://eiti.org/supporters/companies (accessed on November 20, 2014).
28. Myanmar has a legal regime for timber exports requiring certifi cation by MTE and exportation via the port of Yangon and banned the export of raw logs on April 1, 2014. Neighboring importing countries, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Th ailand, also have laws prohibiting the import of illegal Myanmar timber. However, the enforcement of these laws is ineff ective, and improper certifi cation of illegally logged timber has created problems exporting to the European Union and United States (Woods 2013) .Th e Environmental Investigation Agency, a British NGO, estimates that between 2000 and 2013 almost half of the timber logged in Myanmar was cut illegally and that nearly three-quarters of exports, worth $5.7 billion, were smuggled illegally out of the country (Environmental Investigation Agency 2014).
29. For example, Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil CEO, subsequently argued that host-country adherence to EITI signals a commitment to strengthen the business-enabling environment and for example encouraged Equatorial Guinea to join (Aaronson 2011 an "EITI++" program, which assists host governments from the initial bid tendering stage through expenditure management. Th e ability of these initiatives for fostering civil society, as distinct from providing technical assistance to functioning civil society groups, is unclear. Ultimately EITI is only as eff ective as there are mechanisms, including a free press, which allows citizens to exert accountability over their government. In this regard, Myanmar's recent moves toward greater budget transparency and enhanced civil and political freedoms, including critically, press freedoms, make it more likely that EITI can function successfully as intended in Myanmar.
Producers from nonsignatory countries are steadily becoming entangled in the regime. One prong is EITI itself: As more countries begin implementing EITI and validation standards tighten, more and more companies will be subject to host government pressure to participate.
Th e other prong consists of laws and regulations in the US, EU and other jurisdictions. Foreign fi rms listing on US stock exchanges must observe US law, which embodies increasing rigor with respect to transparency and disclosure. 30 Companies are expected to begin reporting in 2015-16. 31 In the case of the European Union, the European Commission proposed one set of rules in June 31. Th e American Petroleum Institute fi led a lawsuit to block the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implementation of Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Th e industry position is that subjecting US and EU fi rms to these requirements would create an unlevel playing fi eld with respect to their non-Western competitors, and that the disclosure requirement could confl ict with confi dentiality agreements required by some host governments, including Angola, Cameroon, the PRC, and Qatar, eff ectively requiring fi rms to break either the law of the United States and/or the European Union or the law of their hosts. US and EU laws assert their primacy in this situation.
In July 2013, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the oil companies, accepting the industry's argument that the payment reports should go to the SEC privately and not be made public. Th e court sent the regulations back to the SEC for revision. Th ese revisions, and what if any impact the court ruling might have for developments in the European Union, Canada, and elsewhere are unclear at this writing. Large US fi rms such as Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, and CononoPhilips would still be covered under the stricter EU laws since they list on European stock exchanges.
Transactions, 32 and similar national and regional laws passed since (Danielsen and Kennedy 2011) . For example, Britain's 2010 Bribery Act goes farther than FCPA, making it illegal to receive a bribe from or bribe private offi cials, but also contains an adequate preventative measures provision that would appear to make it marginally easier for a defendant to insulate itself legally from the profi t-maximizing malfeasance of its employees and agents (Rose-Ackerman 2010, Danielsen and Kennedy 2011) .
Th e oil and gas sector appears to be especially prone to bribery (Weismann 2008; Sanyal 2012, Ultimately the eff ectiveness of EITI and other good governance initiatives to generate better development outcomes in the long run is conditioned on a number of political and institutional factors, such as the existence of a free press and a robust civil society. Myanmar is making progress in these areas, though it is not plausibly under the control of the agencies implementing EITI and related initiatives. A holistic approach is needed to address these multifaceted concerns.
32. Th is convention has been ratifi ed by all members of the OECD as well as six nonmember countries-Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Russian Federation, and South Africa. Enforcement is via national law, with a peer-review mechanism to encourage diligence.
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. Th e trend is clearly toward ratcheting up disclosure requirements for a broad swath of producers. For example, all four of the PRC's major oil companies have foreign operations and all are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (therefore subject to FCPA). Many of the PRC's major extractive fi rms are in joint ventures with Western multinationals such as Total, BP, and BHP Billiton, and thus are included in these operations by extension, though as Moran (2012) observes, there may be signifi cant gaps with respect to coverage of non-Western producers. Moran (2012 notes that a number of major Russian, Chinese, and Indian oil and mining companies do not list in New York or Hong Kong, China and thus would not be subject to EITI via those channels. Th e regulations also do not apply to foreign issuers of American depositary receipts, such as Lukoil and Gazprom.
VI. CONCLUSION
Th e government of Myanmar faces important decisions that will determine the future trajectory of governance reform and condition long-run growth and poverty reduction. Since 2010, the pace of reform has been nothing short of stunning, yet signifi cant challenges remain. While the agenda for continued reform is extensive, we identify the following items as crucial for enhancing government eff ectiveness and locking in recent gains in this area:
1. Increasing bureaucratic salaries and diversifying the candidate pool by targeting underrepresented groups and those likely to face some discrimination in the private labor market.
2. Developing an elite cadre of senior civil servants as a desirable career path.
3. Streamlining the number of line ministries, cutting their number roughly in half, while shifting staffi ng to interministerial coordinating secretariats. In particular, the government should consider merging the Ministries of National Planning and Finance to unite strategic planning and budgeting under one ministry.
4. Achieving a comprehensive ceasefi re with various armed groups.
5. Reforming electoral law to encourage development of more national parties, either by requiring parties to run candidates in all constituencies or by introducing some form of preference voting.
6. Increasing involvement of the private sector (private industry, think tanks, and independent educational institutions) in the policy formation process.
7. Conducting a comprehensive land survey-security conditions permitting-in order to establish a current cadaster map of the country's territory and promote transparency in land use and tenure. Th e
Ministry of Finance and Revenue should conduct this survey.
8. Using EITI as a means to lever Myanmar's indigenous good governance eff orts in the extractive sector, and more broadly, exploiting opportunities to anchor broader policy reforms, including anticorruption eff orts, to international best practices. Specifi cally, in implementing EITI Myanmar can  require company-by-company disclosure,  extend EITI to oil, gas, minerals, and timber,  look favorably on bids by EITI stakeholder fi rms committed to transparency, and  participate in EITI+ and EITI++ extending the transparency initiative upstream to contracting and procurement and downstream to expenditure.
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Likewise, a similar set of arguments holds for foreign anticorruption statutes such as the US FCPA more broadly. Specifi cally, the government of Myanmar should look favorably on bids by fi rms based in jurisdictions with strong antibribery laws and enforcement, thereby "piggy-backing" on the more rigorous standards of foreign partners; if fi rms that fall under the jurisdiction of those governments (whether they be headquartered in that country or not) while in Myanmar violate those countries' anticorruption laws, then the government of Myanmar can appeal to those foreign governments for support in prosecuting corrupt activity. When evaluating potential foreign participants in resource extraction the government of Myanmar should take into account whether those fi rms are subject to the laws of the United States, the European Union, or other jurisdictions with strong antibribery laws and histories of extraterritorial legal cooperation, and give preference to those fi rms (regardless of nationality) whose behavior in Myanmar will be constrained by anticorruption statutes elsewhere. In short, Myanmar should use international initiatives such as EITI and FCPA to leverage its reform eff orts while building its indigenous institutional capacity. Notes: Countries with freedom ratings between 1 and 2.5 are considered "free", between 3 and 5 are considered "partly free", and 5.5 to 7 are considered "not free. " Overall score is the average of "political rights" and "civil liberties" ratings. Reported years refer to year of survey (i.e., "years covered"). 
